



Philosophical writing about the legal practice of punishment has traditionally
focused on two central questions: what (if anything) justifies the practice of
treating certain individuals in ways that typically would be unjustified, and
what considerations should govern how severely legal authorities may punish
in particular cases? Most philosophers of punishment have tended to fall into
one of two broad camps. On one hand, consequentialists have contended
that punishment is justified instrumentally, as a means to some valuable end –
typically crime reduction, and commonly through deterrence, incapacitation
or rehabilitation – and that the severity of punishment should be tailored to
serve this aim. On the other hand, retributivists have regarded the hard
treatment characteristic of punishment as an intrinsically appropriate,
because deserved, response to wrongdoing; as such, retributivists have
argued that punishment must be no more severe than is deserved.
In recent years, however, theorists of punishment have attempted to move
beyond the traditional consequentialist-retributivist arguments, developing
new answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how much’ questions that aim to break the
familiar logjam. In addition, they have broadened the scope of inquiry into
punishment’s justification in various ways. To take just two examples, the-
orists have suggested that whether punishment is justified depends on
whether the legal practices associated with punishment – criminalization,
policing, prosecutions – are themselves justified. Second, the continuing
growth of institutions of international criminal law has spurred new thinking
about the distinctive normative challenges related to punishment in the inter-
national context.
In this essay, I discuss each of these developments in philosophical writing
about punishment. In doing so, I recognize that due to space limitations, the
discussion unavoidably will fail to address much interesting work that has
been done in recent years and will be unable to give many of the accounts
that are considered the sustained attention they deserve. I hope, however,
that this essay provides readers a useful sense of some of the noteworthy
developments in theorizing about punishment in recent years.
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1. Why and how much?
To begin, we should take stock of the state of philosophical debate regarding
the central questions of punishment’s justification – the ‘why’ and ‘how
much’ questions. As I indicated, punishment theory has traditionally con-
sisted primarily of a debate between consequentialists and retributivists. To
oversimplify a bit, consequentialists have tended to view punishment,
because it involves the infliction of burdensome treatment, as an evil, one
which can only be justified if it promotes benefits sufficient to outweigh the
suffering it produces. Retributivists, by contrast, have tended to view punish-
ment as justified not by forward-looking considerations but by backward-
looking ones: namely, punishment is justified insofar as it is a deserved
response to an offender’s prior wrongdoing. Criminal wrongdoers deserve
to suffer, and punishment is justified insofar as it metes out this deserved
suffering.
For consequentialists, retributivism seems barbaric insofar as it would
justify the imposition of punitive hard treatment without reference to any
future beneficial consequences that punishment is likely to promote. Also,
opponents have charged that the retributivist notion of ‘desert’ is inadequate
to provide genuine guidance in sentencing. Retributivists, for their part, have
tended to regard consequentialism as pernicious in part because it is unable
to ground more than contingent constraints against punishment of the inno-
cent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty. Punishing the innocent, or
punishing the guilty more harshly than they deserve, may be unjustified on
consequentialist terms if such punishment tends, on balance, to produce
worse consequences than only punishing the guilty and only as harshly as
they deserve. But these merely contingent constraints have seemed unsatisfy-
ing to many theorists. Also, retributivists have objected that consequentialist
punishment would, in Kantian terms, use an offender as a mere means to
some valuable end, rather than respecting her as an end in herself.
In recent years, punishment theorists have attempted to move beyond the
traditional consequentialist-retributivist impasse by appealing to different
sorts of considerations or by reframing the dilemma in various respects.
The most influential such recent account, in my view, is Antony Duff’s
account of punishment as ‘secular penance’ (Duff 2001). Duff characterizes
the criminal law generally as a communicative enterprise, one in which the
state declares certain sorts of wrongs to be public wrongs – that is, wrongs
that properly concern the polity – and calls on those who commit such
wrongs to answer for their wrongdoing. The institution of punishment, on
Duff’s view, communicates to those found culpably guilty of wrongdoing the
censure, or blame, that is the appropriate response to such wrongdoing.
Duff’s account resembles traditional retributivist accounts in that it regards
punishment as a deserved response to criminal wrongdoing. His view differs
from such accounts, however, in some respects. For one, Duff contends that











what is deserved in response to wrongdoing is not suffering, or hard treat-
ment, but censure. The notion that blame, or censure, is an intrinsically
appropriate response to wrongdoing is more intuitively appealing, he
believes, than the idea that the infliction of suffering is an intrinsically appro-
priate response to such behaviour (Duff, 2001: 27). Still, on Duff’s view, the
burdensomeness characteristic of punishment plays an important role of
bringing home to the offender (and to victims and members of the polity
generally) how seriously the polity takes the wrongdoing. Thus punishment
should be proportionate in severity to the seriousness of the crime so that the
message of censure is properly communicated (Duff, 2001: 132–39).
Duff’s view also differs from traditional retributivist accounts in that it
explicitly contains central forward-looking elements. Part of communicating
censure, he contends, is calling on the person censured to repent of her
wrongdoing (thus ‘secular penance’), to commit to self-reform, and to recon-
cile with her community (Duff, 2001: 107–11). Thus on his account, as on
consequentialist accounts, punishment is forward-looking in the sense that it
aims to bring about certain valuable ends. Unlike on consequentialist
accounts, however, punishment for Duff is not simply a contingently effective
means of achieving these ends; rather, he believes punishment is an intrinsi-
cally appropriate way for the state to communicate censure, and thus an
intrinsically appropriate way to urge offenders to repent, reform and recon-
cile, because such urging just is part of what it is properly to convey deserved
censure (Duff, 2001: 30).
Duff’s account has been influential in the development of normative think-
ing about punishment among both those sympathetic to his general account
and those critical of it. Among accounts that draw on and develop themes
found in Duff’s view of punishment (see, e.g. Brownlee 2007; Garvey 2003;
Hsu 2015; Markel 2012; Tasioulas 2006; Wringe 2010) perhaps the most
prominent is Christopher Bennett’s account of punishment as an apology
ritual (2008). Punishment can be justified, on Bennett’s view, as a means
of making offenders engage in the sort of apologetic behaviour they would
choose to undertake if they were genuinely sorry for what they did. Thus
punishment’s justification, on Bennett’s view as on Duff’s, is grounded at
least in part in the deeper social meanings of the practices of blaming, offer-
ing apology and making amends. But Bennett emphasizes that offenders need
not apologize sincerely (thus apology ritual); rather, it is sufficient if the state
requires them to do what they would do if they were genuinely sorry and
motivated to make amends (Bennett 2008: 154, 172–73). Requiring this
behaviour is the appropriate way for the state to express its condemnation
of the wrongdoing, Bennett contends, and the state is justified in such expres-
sions of condemnation by its legitimate interest in setting limits on how
citizens treat each other. Thus although Bennett, like Duff, characterizes
his view as retributivist, it does not fit neatly with traditional retributivist
accounts of punishment as simply meting out the suffering offenders deserve.











Critics of expressive retributivist views such as Duff’s and Bennett’s have
objected to such accounts on various grounds. In particular, some have
challenged the notion that punishment is essential to conveying societal con-
demnation (see Boonin 2008: 176–79; Hanna 2008; Ko¨nigs 2013; Tadros
2011: 103). It may be, as a contingent matter, a more effective means of
doing so than other options (non-punitive denunciation, e.g.), but an account
that relies on its contingent effectiveness begins to look more like the sort of
consequentialist account of which both Duff and Bennett are critical (but see
Glasgow 2015: 611–20).
Others have charged that Duff’s version, at least, by making penance a
central aim of punishment, suggests an overly intrusive picture of the state. A
liberal democratic state should not be in the business, say critics, of coercing
offenders with the aim of inducing moral repentance, of bringing them to
share the community’s attitudes or values (see Bennett 2006; Ciocchetti 2004;
von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: Ch. 7). On this last point, Bennett contends
that his view fares better than Duff’s, in that on his view the state does not
seek to elicit genuine remorse or repentance through punishment (Bennett
2008: 150–51, 2016: 223–24). Rather, through punishment the state
expresses its condemnation of the crime by forcing the offender to undertake
what he would voluntarily undertake if he were genuinely sorry for his crime
and concerned to make amends. But this ‘apology’ is merely a ritual; it need
not be sincere for the punishment properly to serve the state’s aim of con-
demnation of and dissociation from the crime. This point, however, has
generated criticism of its own: don’t apologies lose much of their value if
they are given merely as rituals, rather than sincerely (see Martı´ 2012; Smith
2014: 64)?
Expressivist views, while prominent in recent years, have not been the only
theories on offer: a number of philosophers have developed accounts that
appeal to other considerations. Each of these, in its own way, has attempted
to avoid the pitfalls associated with traditional consequentialist or retributi-
vist accounts. One such strategy grounds the justification of punishment in
the logic of self-defence. The justification of self-defence seems to involve
forward- and backward-looking elements: in the paradigmatic case, a
person uses force to avert an attack, but the attacker makes himself liable
to such defensive force by attacking the person. In this simple case, it is fairly
uncontroversial that a person is justified in using force to avert the attack.
Punishment, however, inflicts harsh treatment on those who have been found
guilty of committing past offences. How then, would considerations of self-
defence help to illuminate the justification of punishment? Here, self-defence
theorists tend to draw on the notion of general deterrence: the threat of
punishment serves to deter potential offenders; thus a system of deterrent
punishment is a way for society to defend itself and its members against
criminal wrongdoing.











Insofar as self-defence views have relied on the notion of deterrence, they
have faced the same sort of objection traditionally levelled against general
deterrence views: society may be justified in threatening punishment to help
deter potential offenders and reduce crime, but what justifies it in carrying
out the threatened punishment on those who offend anyway (see Boonin
2008: 195–200)? If the punishment is intended to maintain the credibility
of the threat for future cases, then again it seems that the person punished is
used as a mere means to help modify the behaviour of other potential
offenders.
Anthony Ellis (2012) offers a recent articulation and defence of the self-
defence view. His answer to the ‘mere means’ objection is that we should
think of the institution of punishment as issuing a deterrent threat but a
threat that automatically will be carried out if the potential offender ignores
the threat and commits the violation anyway. On such a system of automatic
retaliation, an offender isn’t used as a means to maintain a credible threat
against others; rather, the punishment is simply an automatic result of her
failure to heed the threat (2012: 165–67). One question, on such an account,
is what justifies creating the system so that retaliation automatically follows
from one’s failure to heed the threat. But Ellis maintains that this automati-
city might be motivated by various reasons; as long as the motivating reason
is not to maintain the credibility of the threat against others, then he believes
the self-defence account need not run afoul of the objection that it would use
offenders as mere means (Ellis 2012: 167).
Victor Tadros (2011) also draws on the notion of self-defence, albeit in a
different way. Through a series of increasingly elaborate thought experi-
ments, he examines the logic of self-defence and what implications this
may have when an offence has already been committed. On Tadros’s
‘Duty View’, just as a potential victim is entitled to defend herself against
an attacker, she is also entitled, if the offence is completed, to use the offender
to help defend herself against future threats. This is because the offender
incurs a duty to her victim to remedy the harm she caused, but if she
cannot remedy the harm, then her duty to the victim is to help defend against
future threats the victim may face from others (Tadros 2011: 268–91). And
one way for the offender to help avert future threats is to suffer punishment,
thus helping to deter other potential offenders. Victims also have a duty,
however, to transfer the duty offenders incur to them to the state instead
(Tadros 2011: 293–311). Therefore, the offender’s duty in such cases is to
suffer punishment to help the state maintain a credible deterrent threat, thus
helping defend society against threats to its members’ safety and security (for
a critique of Tadros’s account, see Alexander 2013).
Other notable recent accounts of punishment include Thom Brooks’s
attempt to develop a broadly ‘unified theory’ on which punishment’s func-
tion is to restore and protect individuals’ rights (2012), and Christopher
Heath Wellman’s defence of the rights-forfeiture view (2012). Brooks











incorporates a variety of considerations – deterrence, retribution, proportion,
etc. – as aims of punishment in his pluralistic account, which he contends is
more theoretically coherent than previous hybrid views (most famously, H.
L. A. Hart’s). Wellman’s rights-based account would circumvent the tradi-
tional consequentialist-retributivist debates by focusing on what he takes to
be the normatively prior question of whether punishment violates the rights
of those punished (for an attempt to combine rights-forfeiture and self-
defence accounts, see Alm 2013).
By contrast, some recent works have concluded that the institution of
punishment is not justified. David Boonin (2008) and Deidre Golash
(2005) review the range of proposed justifications of the practice and offer
detailed objections to each. Such strategies do not, of course, demonstrate
that punishment cannot be justified; at best, they may demonstrate that the
practice is not justified by accounts currently on offer. Nevertheless, they thus
challenge defenders of punishment to answer their objections or to find more
plausible alternative justifications. Michael Zimmerman (2011) goes further,
attacking notions of desert and culpability on which criminal punishment
rests by contending that many acts of moral wrongdoing are committed in
ignorance that the acts are wrong, and that it is often (typically?) only moral
luck that distinguishes wrongdoers from others. These lines of argument are
not new, but Zimmerman develops them more thoroughly than others have
done; to the extent that they are compelling, they threaten not only tradi-
tional ideas about criminal punishment but also about blaming and holding
responsible more generally.
2. Punishment theory as political rather than (solely) moral philosophy
Several of the recent accounts of punishment – for example, Duff’s view of
punishment as a communicative enterprise between a polity and its members,
or Ellis’s or Tadros’s accounts of punishment as a justified measure societies
impose to protect themselves and their members from crime – encourage us
to understand punishment’s justification as a question of political rather than
(solely) moral philosophy. Many scholars have picked up on this point,
contending that the traditional casting of the problem of punishment as
centrally a moral rather than a political problem has had a detrimental
effect on theorizing on the topic. Punishment is, on this view, arguably the
paramount example of a state’s exercise of power over its citizens; thus
what’s needed is an account of when (if ever) punishment constitutes a legit-
imate exercise of state power. Theorists have therefore attempted to move
scholarly discussion of the criminal law and punishment forward by shifting
the focus from moral philosophical debates about the permissibility of pun-
ishment to deter or mete out retribution to political philosophical debates
about the circumstances in which state coercion is legitimate (see Brudner











2009; Chiao 2016; Dagger 2011a, b; Matravers 2011; Sigler 2011; Thorburn
2011).
A number of attempts to push the debate towards political theory have
been Rawlsian in flavour, which is interesting given that Rawls’s major
writings, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, contain very little
consideration of punishment’s justification.1 Nevertheless, scholars attracted
to Rawls’s contractualist political philosophy – according to which, basically,
just political institutions are those which all citizens as free and equal could
reasonably be expected to endorse – have sought to glean insights from
Rawls’s approach for what a justifiable institution of punishment would
look like. One advantage of such an approach, contend its advocates, is
that it is sensitive to what Rawls called the fact of reasonable pluralism. In
a liberal democracy, citizens will disagree about moral questions such as
whether punishment is a deserved response to wrongdoing, what constitutes
proportionate punishment, or whether it is permissible to punish offenders to
deter others from committing similar crimes. As Vincent Chiao writes:
‘Taking the problem of reasonable pluralism seriously . . . is taking ser-
iously the thought that the appropriate scope and use of the criminal
law is a political rather than a moral problem. It is a question for a
theory of politics, not a quasi-religious debate among adherents of
different comprehensive doctrines’
(Chiao 2016: 28; see also Thorburn 2011).
Sharon Dolovich (2004) offers an extensive Rawlsian account of punish-
ment, in which we begin by asking what position regarding punishment
deliberators in a Rawlsian ‘original position’ would choose. We should
expect, Dolovich contends, that they would select as if they might be either
victim or offender when the ‘veil of ignorance’ is lifted and they enter into
society as citizens. She argues that deliberators in such a position would
endorse an institution of punishment, but one with strong constraints: in
particular, a parsimony principle, according to which ‘in all cases punishment
must be no more severe than necessary to achieve the relevant deterrent
effect’ (Dolovich 2004: 401).
Broadly Rawlsian approaches to punishment have also been developed by
Corey Brettschneider (2007) and Matt Matravers (2011). Other theorists, by
contrast, have grounded their accounts of punishment in broadly republican
political theories (see, e.g. Dagger 2011a; Duff 2001: 35–73; Yankah 2015).
1 Rawls did address the question of punishment in an earlier article: ‘Two Concepts of
Rules’, The Philosophical Review 64:1 (1955): 3–32. The rule-utilitarian account he devel-
ops in this article, however, seems inconsistent with the central themes of his later works.











3. Punishment, criminal law and the state
Another notable development in punishment theory in recent years, related to
the conception of punishment’s justification as a question of legitimate state
coercion, is the growing recognition that punishment cannot ultimately be
justified in isolation from the rest of the criminal law or from the state itself.
Punishment is meted out by the state against those apprehended, charged and
convicted of violating some criminal law(s). Thus, if the broader institutions
of criminal law and justice are unjustified, or if the state itself is illegitimate,
then inflictions of punishment will be unjustifiable.
For example, if a polity passes laws criminalizing behaviours that are not
justifiably prohibited, then the punishment it metes out for violations of these
laws will be unjustified. Thus as Douglas Husak (2008) has persuasively
argued, questions of criminalization are directly relevant to the justification
of punishment. To assess whether punishment is justified, we need an
account of the principles or considerations relevant to determining what
behaviours may be criminalized. It is perhaps surprising, then, to realize
that the question of criminalization has traditionally received comparatively
little scrutiny from theorists concerned with the justification of punishment.
Husak himself offers a thoughtful and compelling account of criminalization:
on his view, justified criminalization requires that the conduct proscribed be
non-trivially harmful or evil; that it be wrongful; that violations deserve state
punishment; that the burden of justification fall on those who endorse the
criminalization; that the criminalization aim at a substantial state interest;
that it directly advance that interest and that it be no more extensive than
necessary to advance the interest. Critics have taken issue with whether these
conditions would, in practice, serve to limit criminalization as Husak intends
(Gardner 2008; Ramsay 2010; Tadros 2009). Arguably, however, Husak’s
most valuable contribution is in helping to reinvigorate an important line of
inquiry that has for too long been largely dormant (see, e.g. Duff et al. 2014;
Green 2011; Ho¨rnle 2012; Sumner 2011; Tomlin 2014; Yaffe 2012; Yankah
2011; see also Duff and Green 2005).
Punishment’s justification depends not only on the justification of the laws
whose violations the state punishes but also on the legitimacy of the proce-
dures by which the state apprehends, charges and prosecutes individuals.
Thus Alice Ristroph (2015, 2016) has contended that if we are interested
in establishing whether punishment is justified, we should spend time con-
sidering the criminal processes surrounding punishment as well as possible
defences of punishment itself (for notable recent accounts, see, e.g. Loader
2014 on policing; Lippke 2011 on plea bargaining; Duff et al. 2004, 2006,
2007 on criminal trials; Flanders 2013 on pardons). More generally, we
should ask whether the state itself has standing to punish; the existence of
severe social injustices may undermine a state’s standing to punish offenders
who are victims of such injustices (see, e.g. Chau 2012; Duff 2007; Holroyd











2010; Howard 2013; Matravers 2006). What’s more, the justification of
punishment may depend on how we think about the host of so-called ‘col-
lateral’ burdens, both legal and extra-legal, faced by those with criminal
convictions: do these burdens ever themselves count, as some have suggested,
as forms of ‘invisible punishment;’ and should these burdens factor into
assessments of what constitutes a proportionate response to a criminal
offence (see Hoskins 2016; LaFollette 2005; Travis 2003)?
4. Punishment in the international context
Theorizing about punishment has expanded its scope in other respects, as
well. With the gradual development since the Nuremberg Trials of institu-
tions of international criminal law, theorists have begun to see that prosecut-
ing and punishing wrongdoing at the international level raises distinctive
conceptual and normative puzzles. Perpetrators of international crimes
such as genocide may be subject to prosecution and punishment in the
International Criminal Court or in one or another international tribunal.
But what is it about certain crimes that makes their prosecution and punish-
ment a matter for international legal authorities whereas other crimes are
thought to be properly addressed at the domestic level? This question is
especially difficult with respect to crimes that do not cross boundaries,
crimes that occur in a state of which the perpetrators and victims are both
members. Are such crimes ever properly tried and punished by international
legal authorities? If so, why?
One prominent answer is offered by Larry May (2005). May contends,
first, that when a state fails to provide its citizens with security and subsis-
tence, the state has ‘no right to prevent international legal bodies from jus-
tifiably infringing that state’s sovereignty’ (May 2005: 68). He terms this the
‘security principle’. This principle alone, however, only says that in such
circumstances a state has no right against international intervention; it
does not yet say that international prosecutions and punishment are justified
in such cases. Thus he offers a second principle, the ‘international harm
principle’, which states that international prosecutions and punishment are
justified only in cases of ‘serious harm to the international community’ (May
2005: 83), where such harm is group-based either in the sense of being based
on group characteristics of the victims or in the sense that it is perpetrated by
a state or another type of group. Critics have challenged, variously, May’s
reliance on a harm-based account of crime (Renzo 2010) and his claim that
such crimes harm the international community or humanity as a whole
(Altman 2006).
More recently, David Luban (2010) has argued that crimes that are suffi-
ciently heinous may be prosecuted and punished by international authorities
if there are adequate procedures in place to ensure that trials and punishment
are fair. Antony Duff (2010), however, has suggested that the heinousness of











the crimes and the existence of fair procedures are not enough. What we also
need, in Duff’s view, is some account of why a particular legal entity (in this
case, the institutions of international criminal law) has standing to call parti-
cular offenders (in this case, perpetrators of atrocities such as genocide) to
account. What is it, then, that in some cases makes perpetrators answerable
to the international community rather than to one or another state? (On this
question of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see also
Altman and Wellman 2004; Davidovic 2016; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012;
Lee 2010; Wellman 2011.)
Furthermore, given that crimes such as genocide are perpetrated by groups
of people rather than by individuals acting alone, questions arise regarding
how international legal institutions should assign responsibility for such
crimes. Such questions are not unique to the international context: corpora-
tions or other groups have perpetrated crimes at the domestic level, and thus
have raised questions about how to assign responsibility for the wrongdoing
(see, e.g. Hartogh 2009; Pettit 2007). But the magnitude of group-
perpetrated international atrocities – such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide,
in which roughly 800,000 people were murdered in a span of about 100 days
– makes concerns about assigning responsibility for crimes perpetrated by
groups of individuals especially poignant. The Nuremberg Tribunal
expressed what has since been the governing view in international criminal
law itself:
‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’.2
But some scholars have recently begun to suggest that for some mass crimes,
states themselves are the appropriate objects of punishment – either instead
of or in addition to the individual perpetrators (see Erskine 2011; Lang 2007;
Tanguay-Renaud 2013).
Justifications of state punishment quickly run into a crucial challenge,
however: in any ostensibly state-perpetrated crime, there will as a practical
reality always be many members of the state who did not participate in the
atrocity, or perhaps who actively spoke out against it, or even who were
among its victims. Thus punishing states qua states risks inflicting punitive
burdens on individuals who were innocent of the crime – or worse, victims of
it. Defenders of the idea of state punishment have suggested that the punish-
ment need not distribute among the members of the state (see Erskine 2011;
Pasternak 2011; Tanguay-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014), or that the
ends of such punishment may be sufficiently valuable to override concerns
about harm to innocents (see Lang 2007: 255).
2 International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals, judgement of
1 October 1946; reprinted in 41 American Journal of International Law (1947) 221.











There have been other interesting recent developments in theorizing about
punishment – perhaps most notably the challenges generated by advances in
neuroscience (see, e.g. Greene and Cohen 2004; Vincent 2010) – but space
prohibits my discussing these here. I have tried, however, to highlight some of
the notable ways recent work on punishment has aimed to shed new light on
traditional questions or to expand to address new ones.
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